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Abstract—Together with the spread of DevOps practices and
container technologies, Microserivce Architecture has become a
mainstream architecture style in recent years. Resilience is a
key characteristic in Microservice Architecture Systems(MSA
Systems), and it shows the ability to cope with various kinds
of system disturbances which cause degradations of services.
However, due to lack of consensus definition of resilience in the
software field, although many works have been done on resilience
for MSA Systems, developers still don’t have a clear idea on
how resilient an MSA System should be, and what resilience
mechanisms are needed.
In this paper, by referring to existing systematic studies on
resilience in other scientific areas, the definition of microservice
resilience is provided and a Microservice Resilience Measurement
Model is proposed to measure service resilience. And we give a
requirement model to represent resilience requirements of MSA
Systems. A process framework is also proposed to elicit MSA
System resilience requirements. As a proof of concept, a case
study is conducted on an MSA System to illustrate how the
resilience requirements are elicited and represented.
Index Terms—Microservice; Resilience; Requirement Specifi-
cation; Requirement Elicitation Methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Microservice Architecture (aka Microservices)[1] is a new
architectural style which modularizes software components as
services, which are called microservices, and makes services
and service development teams as independent of each other
as possible. In recent years, Microservice Architecture has
already been a mainstream architecture style adopted by many
leading internet companies[2][3]. Shifting to Microservice
Architecture promises fast time-to-market of individual ser-
vices, and enables modern development processes like Con-
tinuous Delivery[4], DevOps[5]. Besides the delivery speed,
scalability, flexibility in resource allocation, code reuse and
other features are also improved greatly by the Microservice
Architecture.
Although the Microservice Architecture has many bene-
fits, Microservice Architecture Systems (MSA Systems) are
more fragile than traditional monolithic systems[6], because
Microservices are usually deployed in a more sophisticated
environment using virtual infrastructures like virtual machines
and containers, and there are lots of components for service
decoupling and management (e.g. API Gateway, Message
Queue, Service Registry, etc.). Threats come from anywhere
in an MSA System: small-density components with faults [7],
unstable message passing among microservices[8], the under-
lying cloud environment with unreliable containers, virtual
machines, or bare-metal servers[9]. Even normal actions taken
1This manuscript is draft only, not intended for publication
in cloud environments like software/hardware upgrades and
dynamic changes in configuration files may lead to severe
service outages, which are lessons learned from hundreds of
service outage reports of cloud companies in the literature[10].
Reliability, availability and fault tolerance etc. are tradi-
tional metrics to evaluate a software system’s ability to cope
with failures [11]. These metrics assume that a software
system has two states such as ”Available/Unavailable” or
”Reliable/Unreliable”, and calculate the probability of these
two states. However, recent studies on cloud system failures
[12][10][13] found that cloud systems are more likely to
be in a ”limped” state rather than be totally unavailable.
The ”limped” state means that although a cloud system can
provide services with normal functionalities, the services work
in performance under users’ satisfaction, which is known as
service degradation. In such situation, metrics like reliability
or availability can’t evaluate the software system so well. For
example, in situation A, the average response time of an MSA
System’s service is degraded from 3 seconds to 5 seconds
due to a failure; while in situation B, the average response
time of the service is degraded from 3 seconds to 12 seconds
due to the same failure. The failure recovery time of these
two situations are the same. It is obvious that the service in
situation A performs better than the service in situation B
when failure happens. But if we take ”response time higher
than 3 seconds” as an unreliable state, the metrics of service
reliability in these two situations are the same.
As a result, many practitioners of the Microservice Archi-
tecture [14][15][16], proposed Resilience as a characteristic
describing how an MSA System copes with the occurrence of
failures and recovers the degraded service back to its normal
performance. Existing reliability/fault tolerant mechanisms
used in Service-Oriented Architectures and cloud platforms
like Circuit Breakers and Bulkheads, are used as resilience
mechanisms in MSA Systems[8][15].
Although engineering resilience in MSA Systems has
gained popularity among designers and engineers, the con-
sensus on how engineering resilience can be designed and
improved has not yet been reached. Until now, there is no
common definition for microservice resilience. And although
several works have been done for software resilience bench-
marking [17] [18], available engineering quantification metrics
still exhibit very little standardization.
Due to no standard definitions and quantification metrics for
microservice resilience, it is hard to make definite resilience
requirements for MSA Systems. As a result, microservice
developers seldom have a clear idea of the following questions
about resilience, which may lead to development failures
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2according to the theory of requirement engineering[19].
1) What is microservice resilience?
2) How to evaluate microservice resilience?
3) How resilient an MSA System should be?
4) How to set goals for resilience mechanisms?
Furthermore, how to represent resilience requirements for
MSA Systems is an another problem to face even if stan-
dard definitions and quantification metrics of microservice
resilience are given. Although Domain Driven Design (DDD)
[20] is the suggested way to build MSA System requirements
[14], integrating resilience into DDD seems to be difficult.
DDD focuses on how to decompose a system to microservices
by business context boundaries, so introducing notions in
resilience like service degradations, failures may trouble the
partition of context boundaries. Another type of requirement
model is needed for microservice resilience requirements.
In order to solve the problems above, this paper works on
the representation and elicitation of MSA System resilience
requirements, contributions of this paper are:
• By referring to systematic studies on definitions and mea-
surements of resilience in other scientific areas. We pro-
vide the definition of microservice resilience. And a Mi-
croservice Resilience Measurement Model (MRMM) is
proposed to measure service resilience of MSA Syetems.
• Based on MRMM, a requirement model is designed to
represent resilience requirements of MSA Systems. The
requirement model contains a Resilience Goal Decom-
position View refining service resilience goals to system
behaviors with a customized goal model, and a Resilience
Mechanism Implementation View to show how resilience
mechanisms work in MSA Systems.
• A process framework to elicit resilience requirements
of MSA Systems is proposed. The process framework
outlines steps to elicit our resilience requirement model
for MSA Systems, which follows the methodology of
Goal-Oriented Requirement Engineering.
The remain of this paper organizes as follows: Section II
summarises some related works of this paper; Section III
provides the definition of microservice resilience and pro-
posed Microservice Resilience Measurement Model; Section
IV proposes the service resilience requirement model based
on the definition and measurement model in Section III;
Section V describes the process framework to elicit MSA
System reslience requirements; In Section VI a case study
is conducted using an MSA System to illustrate the whole
resilience requirement elicitation process, and Section VII
makes conclusion of this paper and outlines some future
works.
II. RELATED WORKS
This section discusses existing related studies in these three
research areas: Resilience in other scientific areas, Resilience
in microservices, and Goal-Oriented Requirement Engineer-
ing.
A. Resilience in Other Scientific Areas
The word ”resilience”, originates from the Latin verb ”re-
silire”, means an object’s ability to bonus back to its normal
Fig. 1. The Reslience Triangle Model Proposed in [25]
size after being pulled or pushed. Holling [21] firstly used
this word in the field of ecology, to represent an ecosystem’s
ability to absorb disturbances. In recent decades, the notion
of resilience has been used in many scientific areas, like
psychology, city planning, management science, etc. As is
described in Righi’s review of resilience engineering[22], the
ability of anticipating/being aware of hazards, the capacity of
adapting to variability, and the ability of responding/restoring
are major concerns of resilience.
In Hosseini’s literal review on system resilience[23], re-
silience assessment is classified into two categories: qual-
itative approaches and quantitative approaches. Qualitative
approaches gives concept framework of practices to archieve
resilience[24], which is usually used in Society-Ecology,
Organization Management, and Healthcare. Quantitative ap-
proaches use resilience curves to illustrate the resilient behav-
ior of an engineered system undergoing a disruptive event.
Many researchers used the properties of the resilience curve
to the measure the resilience of the system.
Figure 1 shows the Bruneau’s resilience triangle model
[25] on a resilience curve, which is the most used resilience
model in quantitative assessment. In Figure 1, the x-axis
stands for the time and the y-axis stands for the quality of
a system. The Bruneau’s model proposed three dimensions of
Resilience: Robustness, Rapidity and Resilience. Robustness
and Rapidity are the measurements on the x and y axis in
Figure 1, while Resilience measures the shaded area in Figure
1. A great number of researches on resilience quantification
also proposed metrics on these three dimensions [26][27] [23].
B. Resilience in Microservices
The importance of resilience has been pointed out in many
practitioner books of microservices [14][15][16], and studies
discussing key features of MSA Systems [6][28], which makes
it a common sense that resilience is a key characteristic
in MSA Systems. In these books and studies, some typical
resilience mechanisms like the Circuit Breakers and Bulkheads
[8] are mentioned.
In recent years there have been several resilience related
works on MSA Systems. Richter et al. showed that the Mi-
croservice Architecture itself can have positive impacts on de-
pendability and fault-tolerance[29]. Nane analyzed the impact
of containers to microservice performance [30]. Giovanni, et
al, proposed a self-managing mechanism for MSA System[31],
3where auto-scaling and health management of services are
implemented by monitoring. Soenen et al. designed a scalable
mechanism for microservice-based NFV System for fault re-
covery and high availability [32]. Zwietasch used Time-Series
Prediction method to predict failures in MSA Systems[33].
Stefan et al. designed a decision guidance model for service
discovery and fault of microservices, where some faults in
an MSA System are related to certain designs in the system
[34]. Heorhiadi et al, designed a resilience testing framework
for the Microservice Architecture [35], how to inject faults
into microservices was not discussed in detail. Brogi proposed
a reference dataset generation framework for microservices
which includes failure data[36]. Thomas and Andre, built a
meta-model for MSA Systems, which is used for performance
and resilience benchmarking[37], but how this model is used
for benchmarking and how resilience is evaluated was not
discussed.
C. Goal-Oriented Requirement Engineering
Goal-oriented Requirement Engineering (GORE) is a
branch of requirement engineering. GORE is used in earlier
stages of requirements analysis to elicit the requirements from
high-level system goals[38], while object-oriented analysis like
UML[39] fits well to the later stages. KAOS [40][41], i* [42],
GBRAM [43] and the NFR Framework [44] are main goal
modeling frameworks used in GORE[45]. The main concerns
of recent papers on GORE are implementations, integrations,
extensions and evaluations of the main goal models, which is
summarized by the literature review of Jennifer et al. [46].
Few works were done on GORE for microservice-
related systems. Wang et al. introduced service discovery in
GORE, which helps the requirement decomposition of SOA
systems[47]. Zardari and Bahsoon discussed about how GORE
is adapted into clouds[48].
On GORE with failures or performance, Rashid et al.
extended the goal-oriented model to aspect-oriented model,
which separates the functional and non-functional properties
of a requirement [49]. Robert and Axel presented an approach
to use exiting refinements as a refinement pattern for goal
refinement [50], which proved the validity of refinement in the
studies above. Van and Letier integrated the notion of obstacle
into their KAOS model in [51]. And then Axel presented
formal techniques for reasoning about obstacles to satisfaction
of goals in his paper [52], which mainly focuses on finding
and resolving obstacles in functional goals that are too ideal.
Van Lamsweerde explicitly modeled the goals of an attacker,
an agent that creates security risks for the system goals
in KAOS[53]. John, Lawrence and Brian proposed a goal-
oriented framework for Non-Functional Requirements [44],
a series of refinement methods were designed for accuracy
and performance requirements. Fatama et al. proposed a three
layered goal model and conducted multi-objective risk analysis
on the goal model[54].
Similar to the studies above, we integrate notions in mi-
croservice resilience such as disruption, system resources into
a customized goal model to represent resilience requirements
of MSA Systems.
III. MICROSERVICE RESILIENCE
The definition of microservice resilience and a Microservice
Reslience Measurement Model are proposed in this section,
as the basis of resilience requirement representation for MSA
Systems.
A. Definition of Microservice Resilience
By summing up existing viewpoints on resilience in other
scientific areas, and associating these viewpoints with what is
required to be achieved in MSA Systems, we have come to
the following conclusions on MSA System resilience:
• In running environments of MSA Systems, there a lot of
unpredictable events that make services of MSA Systems
perform not as good as expected. These events are termed
”disruptions” in the field of resilience[23] [22].
• It is hard to get the probabilities of disruptions because
the architecture and deployment environment of MSA
Systems always change with the quick iteration of De-
vOps. Considering high fault density in MSA Systems[6],
and assumptions on disruptions in other scientific areas
[23] [27], it can be assumed that disruptions are inevitable
and always happen on MSA Systems.
• Service performance is the main concern of MSA System
Resilience. Disruptions in MSA Systems cause losses
of service performance, which are called service degra-
dations. The curve representing how a service’s perfor-
mance varies from time under a service degradation is a
typical ”resilience curve” in researches of resilience[27].
• Resilient MSA Systems should keep performance de-
graded services from a too low level which is unaccept-
able by users, and make degraded services’ performance
back to normal as fast as possible.
Based on above conclusions, the definition of resilience for
MSA Systems is provided as follows:
Resilience of a Microservice Architecture System is the
ability to maintain the performance of services at an accept-
able level and recover the service back to normal, when a
disruption causes the service degradation.
B. Microservice Resilinece Measurement Model
To quantify the service resilience in MSA System,
we proposed Microservice Resilience Measurement Model
(MRMM). MRMM quantifies the resilience by measuring
service degradations caused by disruptions. Resilience metrics
in MRMM are later used for service resilience goal setting in
resilience requirements.
Figure 2 shows the meta-model of MRMM. Below we
provide the definitions for elements (e.g. Service Resilience,
Disruption Tolerance) in MRMM. Mathematical presentations
of these elements are also given, in order to encode resilience
requirements to formal propositions and verify the satisfiability
of resilience requirements in our future work.
Definition 1 (MSA System and Service):
An MSA System is a software system that provides ser-
vices. Every service in an MSA System is an interface exposed
to users or other systems. Users and other systems can fulfil
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Fig. 2. Meta-Model of MRMM
certain functionalities by accessing services. Factors like how
service are modularized and deployed are not included in our
definition for MSA Systems, because they are out of the scope
of our definition on microservice resilience.
In mathematics, An MSA System is represented by a set
MS = {S1, . . . , Sn} where S1, . . . , Sn are services provided
by the MSA System. Each service is represented by a tuple
S = 〈L,A〉 where:
• L is the label of the service which is used for verification
in Goal Models[55].
• A = {A1, . . . , An} is the set of performance attributes of
the service. Performance attribute is defined in the next
paragraph.
Definition 2 (Service Performance):
Each service in an MSA System has one or several perfor-
mance attributes (e.g. response time, throughput) to evaluate
service performance. Performance Attributes of a service are
decided by type of the service. For example, availability and
success rate are common performance attributes of transac-
tional services, while video stream services are usually bench-
marked by throughputs. Selection of performance attributes
is discussed in detail in our proposed resilience requirement
process framework in Section V.
Service performance is metric of a service’s performance
attribute in a certain time period. Service performance can be
represented by function P (S,A, t), where S is the service, A
is the performance attribute, and t is the timestamp.
In well-developed MSA Systems, real-time service perfor-
mance data can be collected by monitoring tools like cAdvisor,
Zabbix. These data are stored in time-series databases so that
the performance value of a service at a timestamp can be
queried in the form of P (S,A, t).
Definition 3 (Service Performance Benchmark):
A service performance benchmark is the baseline value
of service performance. Service performance benchmarks are
used to judge whether services are degraded. If the service
performance value is lower than its service performance
benchmark at some time, the corresponding service is regarded
as degraded.
Same with mathematical representation of service perfor-
mance, service performance benchmark is represented by
function QB(S,A, t), meaning the baseline value of service
S’s performance attribute a at time t. In mathematics, if the
predicate Degrad(S, t) means a service S is degraded at time
t, Degrad(S, t) can be defined by following propositional for-
mula, where the symbol↔ means the equivalence relationship
in propositional logic.
Degrad(S, t)←→ ∃I, P (S, I, t) < PB(S, I, t) (1)
Depending on the types of services and performance at-
tributes, a service performance benchmark may be either a
constant value (e.g. benchmark of service response time is
usually fixed), or a dynamic value varying from time. How to
set service performance benchmarks is discussed in Section
V.
Definition 4 (Disruption):
A disruption in an MSA System is an event that happens
to the MSA System which makes a service degraded. A
disruption should contain the following information:
• The related objects when a disruption happens. An object
may be any abstract or realistic entity that can be iden-
tified in an MSA system (e.g. servers, containers, CPUs,
processes, network connections, services).
• The event type of a disruption. For an object where a
disruption happens, there are several event types. For
example, a Virtual Machine’s disruption event type may
include VM halt down, OS upgrade, kernel break, etc.
A disruption is represented by the tuple D = 〈O,E〉 in
mathematics, where O,E are the labels of the object and
event type. If the predicate Occur(D, t) means a disruption
D occurs at timestamp t, the fact that D causes service
degradation on service S at timestamp t′ can be presented
by Formula 2.
Occur(D, t) −→ Degrad(S, t′) (2)
Definition 5 (Service Degradation and Service Resilience):
Service degradation is a phenomenon happening in MSA
Systems that a service is kept degraded because of a disruption.
Degraded state of a service is confirmed by judging whether
the service performance is lower than the service performance
benchmark. In mathematics, a service degradation is repre-
sented by tuple SD = 〈S,A,D, ts, te〉, where:
• S is the degraded service;
• A is the performance attribute where service performance
benchmark is violated;
• D is the disruption causing the service degradation;
• ts and te are the start time and the end time of the service
degradation.
5Service degradation shows the impact of a disruption on ser-
vice performance. Service resilience is a model that measures
the impact of a service degradation. Since service performance
values under a service degradation is a typical resilience curve,
by referring to the Bruneau Model[25], three metrics are
included in service resilience to measure a service degradation:
Disruption Tolerance, Recovery Rapidity and Performance
Loss.
• Disruption Tolerance:
Disruption Tolerance measures how much service per-
formance is degraded compared with service performance
benchmark. Disruption Tolerance of a service degradation
is the maximum deviation of service performance from
service performance benchmark in the period of service
degradation. In mathematics, the Disruption Tolerance
DT (SD) of a service degradation SD is represented by
Formula 3.
DT (SD) = max(PB(SD.S, SD.A, t)
− P (SD.S, SD.A, t)), t ∈ [SD.ts, SD.te] (3)
When a service is suffering degradation, the MSA System
should keep the service from severe degradation which is
unacceptable to users (For example, the frame rate of a
video stream service can be lowered a bit but not too low
to make a video look like a slide).
• Recovery Rapidity:
Recovery Rapidity measures how fast a degraded ser-
vice can be recovered and reach the service perfor-
mance benchmark again. Similar to Mean Time to Repair
(MTTR) used in reliability assessment, Recovery Rapid-
ity RR(SD) is measured by calculating the time interval
of the service degradation SD, as is shown in Formula
4.
RR(SD) = SD.te − SD.ts (4)
• Performance Loss:
Performance Loss is a quantification of the magnitude of
service degradation in service performance. Performance
Loss PL(SD) of a service degradation SD is mathemat-
ically expressed by Equation 5.
PL(SD) =
∫ SD.te
SD.ts
[PB(SD.S, SD.A, t)
− P (SD.S, SD.A, t)]dt (5)
Performance Loss measures the cumulative degraded
performance during the service degradation, which is
shown as the shaded area in Figure 1. Performance Loss
can reveal business loss in a service degradation. For
example, if a data transmission service benchmarked by
throughput suffers a service degradation, Performance
Loss can measure how much data is less transmitted than
expected.
Fig. 3. Performance on TPS of a Sample Service Degradation
In time series databases used for monitoring, there al-
ready exist data types used for recording cumulative
values of performance (Like the Counter data type in
Prometheus). So it is possible to collect Performance Loss
data of service degradations in MSA Systems.
Service resilience can measure a service degradation with
these three metrics. Mathematically, Service resilience is rep-
resented by tuple SR = 〈DT,RR,PL〉, where DT , RR
and PL are Disruption Tolerance, Recovery Rapidity, and
Performance Loss.
Take a service with performance attribute TPS (Transac-
tions Per Second) as an example. The performance bench-
mark on TPS of this service is 50 requests/second. When
the service suffered from a disruption and was recovered
later, and collected TPS value during service degradation
is shown in Figure 3. Disruption Tolerance of the service
is 50 − 25 = requests/second, Recovery Rapidity of the
service is 15 − 5 = 10 seconds, and Performance Loss is
5 ∗ (50 − 35) + 5 ∗ (50 − 25) = 200 requests, which means
200 user requests are less processed than expected due to the
disruption.
IV. RESILIENCE REQUIREMENT REPRESENTATION
In Section III, we proposed MRMM to measure service
resilience when a service degradation happens. With measur-
able service resilience metrics, microservice practitioners can
set service resilience goals to indicate how resilient an MSA
System is supposed to be. Service resilience goals specify
service resilience with thresholds of service resilience metrics
in MRMM. For a service with a service resilience goal, service
resilience metrics of any service degradation happened to this
service are expected within the thresholds in service resilience
goal.
When there is a service degradation that violates the service
resilience goal, the service degradation should be further ana-
lyzed to diagnose the disruption causing service degradation.
Then developers establish corresponding resilience mechanism
to mitigate the impact of the identified disruption so that the
service resilience goal is satisfied again. In MSA Systems, a
resilience mechanism is a process consisting of system be-
haviors (like monitoring, failure detection) executed by one or
several components to react to disruptions. And microservice
6practitioners usually use architecture-level diagrams to show
how a resilience mechanism works in MSA Systems[14][56].
Thus the resilience requirement of an MSA System consists
of the following information based on our definition on
microservice resilience and MRMM:
• Service resilience goals;
• Disruptions that cause service resilience goal violations;
• Resilience mechanisms established to mitigate impacts of
disruptions.
We proposed Service Resilience Requirement Model to
represent the microservice resilience requirement above. The
proposed requirement model consists of two views: Resilience
Goal Decomposition View and Resilience Mechanism Imple-
mentation View. In Resilience Goal Decomposition View, we
integrate notions of MRMM into a customized goal model, to
represent service resilience goals. Disruptions causing service
resilience goal violations are regarded as obstacles to service
resilience goals, and resilience mechanisms are resolutions to
these disruptions. Resilience Mechanism Implementation View
uses microservice practitioners’ existing documentation styles
for resilience mechanisms (like architectural-level diagrams
in [14][56]), to show how resilience mechanisms work in
MSA Systems in a more expressive way. Figure 4 shows how
notions in MRMM are represented in Resilience Goal Decom-
position View, and how a resilience mechanism established
in Resilience Goal Decomposition View is implemented in
Resilience Mechanism Implementation View.
A. Resilience Goal Decomposition View
In Resilience Goal Decomposition View, service resilience
goals are set and decomposed with the methodology of
Goal-Oriented Requirement Engineering (GORE) [38]: ser-
vice resilience goals are decomposed into resource resilience
goals, disruptions obstructing service/resource resilience goals
are identified, resilience mechanisms resolving obstacles are
established, and resilience mechanisms are further refined
to detailed system behaviors which can be implemented by
components of MSA Systems.
Resilience Goal Decomposition View uses a mainstream
goal model, KAOS[41], which is more expressive than other
goal models[57], and notions in MRMM are integrated into
this goal model. The customized goal model uses basic ele-
ments in KAOS: goal, obstacle, agent and domain property.
Besides these elements, we introduce an new element asset
to our goal model to represent necessary services and system
resources in MSA Systems. The symbolic representations of
these elements in diagrams are shown in the example in
Figure 4. The following paragraphs explains in detail how
resilience requirements of an MSA Systems are represented in
Resilience Goal Decomposition View, and some mathematical
representations are given, for our future work on verifying
resilience goal satisfaction.
1) Service Resilience Goal:
Goals are objectives that the target system should achieve.
In KAOS, goals cover different types of concerns: from high-
level, strategic concerns, to low-level, technical concerns;
from functional concerns, to non-functional concerns[38]. In
diagrams of our proposed goal model, goals are represented
by blue parallelograms.
Service resilience goals are final goals to achieve in an
MSA System, which specify how resilient the services in
MSA Systems are supposed to be. A service resilience goal of
a service contains thresholds of service resilience metrics in
MRMM. And the performance attribute is also specified in a
service resilience goal, because service resilience metrics are
calculated from service performance variations.
Mathematically, if RG(S,A) means the service resilience
goal RG of service S on performance attribute A, and the
predicate satisfy(RG) means RG is satisfied, based on
definitions of service degradation and service resilience in
MRMM, RG satisfies the propositional formula in Formula
6, where SD(S,A) means all service degradations of service
S on performance attribute A.
satisfy(RG(S,A))←→ ∀SD ∈ SD(S,A),
(RE(SD).DT < RG.DT )∧
(RE(SD).RR < RG.RR)∧
(RE(SD).PL < RG.PL) (6)
A service resilience goal is linked to an asset representing
the service and a domain property representing the service
performance benchmark, to show which service the service
resilience goal specifies and which service performance bench-
mark is used to calculate service resilience when service
degradation happens, as is shown in Figure 5.
In KAOS models, textual specification of elements is
required[58]. We use the following information to specify a
service resilience goal:
• Goal Name: The identifier of the service resilience goal;
• Service: The service which the service resilience goal
specifies;
• Performance Attribute: The performance attribute of the
service resilience goal;
• Service Resilience Thresholds: Thresholds of service
resilience metrics.
2) Resilience Goal Refinement:
In KAOS model, A high-level goal can be refined to low-
level goals, these low-level goals are called sub goals of the
high-level goal. There are two types of refinements: AND-
refinement and OR-refinement.
AND-refinement means a goal can be achieved by satisfy-
ing all of its sub goals. Given a goal G0 and a set of G0’s sub
goals {G1, . . . , Gn}, AND-refinement is textually denoted as
G0
AND−−−→ {G1, . . . , Gn}. Mathematically, AND-refinement
satisfies the propositional Formula 7.
n∧
i=1
satisfied(Gi) −→ satisfied(G0) (7)
OR-refinement means a goal can be achieved when one of
its sub goals is satisfied. Given a goal G0 and a set of G0’s
sub goals {G1, . . . , Gn}, OR-refinement is textually denoted
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In our goal model, each service resilience goal is refined
to resilience goals of service’s dependency system resources
which ensure the running of the service (such as containers,
VMs), if the performance attribute of the service resilience
goal is directly influenced by performance attributes of these
system resources. Resource resilience goals can be further
refined to resilience goals of resources’ dependency system
resources. Such refinement is an AND-refinement because a
service resilience goal may be obstructed by just one resource
resilience goal violation.
When disruptions that obstructs service/resource resilience
goals are found, resilience mechanisms are established to
resolve disruptions. These resilience mechanisms are sub goals
of service/resource resilience goals since they promise the
satisfaction of service/resource resilience goals. The refine-
ment from a resilience goal to a resilience mechanisms is an
OR-refinement, because when a disruption happens, only the
corresponding resilience mechanism is required.
Resilience mechanisms are decomposed one or several
times by AND/OR-refinements, until detailed system behav-
iors which can be executed by individual components in
MSA Systems are figured out. System behaviors of resilience
mechanisms are represented by blue parallelograms with bold
borders to show that they are terminal goals in the goal model.
Each system behavior is linked with an agent representing a
system component, to show which component executes the
system behavior.
Figure 7 shows the whole goal refinement from a service
resilience goal to system behaviors in Resilience Goal Decom-
position View.
3) Resilience Obstacle:
Obstacles are a dual notion to goals in goal models, and
they are represented by red parallelograms. When obstacles get
true, some goals may not be achieved[52]. In our goal model,
service degradations are obstacles to service resilience goals.
And a service degradation is transformed into a disruption
obstructing a resource resilience goal after the service degra-
dation is diagnosed, as is shown in Figure 8. The disruption is
linked to the affected system resource and then corresponding
resilience mechanism will take actions to the resource.
The textual specification of an obstacle contains the follow-
ing information:
• Obstacle Name: The identifier of the obstacle;
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• Event: The description that how service/resource re-
silience goals are obstructed.
Service
Service Resilience Goal
Service Degradation
(a) Service Degradation Obstructing Service Re-
silience Goal
Service
Service Resilience Goal
Disruption
Resource
Resource Resilience Goal
······
(b) Disruption Obstructing Resource Resilience Goal
Fig. 8. A Service Degradation(a) and its Root Cause Disruption(b)
4) Asset:
Assets are services or system resources(like containers,
physical servers) in an MSA System. Assets are represented
by purple hexagons in diagrams of our proposed goal model.
Textual specification of an asset includes the asset name and
the asset type.
A service asset is linked with assets representing service’s
dependency system resources, and these resource assets are
linked with other resource assets. Identified dependency re-
lationships among assets are used as references to service
resilience goal refinement and service degradation diagnose.
5) Agent:
Agents are individual objects that perform behaviors to
archive goals[38]. In our goal model, agents are represented
as yellow hexagons, and they represent for components in
an MSA System that execute system behaviors decomposed
from resilience mechanisms. Individual components for MSA
System operation like monitoring tools or anomaly detectors
are typical agents in Resilience Goal Decomposition View.
Same with assets, textual information of agents includes the
agent name and the agent type.
6) Domain Property:
Domain properties are indicative statements of domain
knowledge which are used as references of elements in
KAOS[38][59]. Service performance benchmarks are domain
properties of service resilience goals, because service per-
formance benchmarks are key variables to calculate service
resilience metrics in MRMM. Domain knowledges of MSA
Systems (like architectural patterns, operation principles) are
domain properties of resilience mechanisms, because they are
the references of resilience mechanisms. A domain property is
represented by an orange pentagon, and textual specifications
of domain properties include the following information:
• Domain Property Name: The identifier of the domain
property;
• Description: Detailed description of the domain property;
• Reference Resources: Reference links to related docu-
mentations of the domain property.
B. Resilience Mechanism Implementation View
Resilience Mechanism Implementation View shows how
a resilience mechanism, which is established in Resilience
Goal Decomposition View, is implemented in an MSA Sys-
tem. Existing documentation styles for resilience mechanisms
(like architecture-level diagrams used for Circuit Breakers
and Bulkheads in [14][60]) are directly used for Resilience
Mechanism Implementation View, because there is no need
to design a new model since these documentation styles are
expressive enough.
Resilience Mechanism Implementation View is drawn ac-
cording to the elements in Resilience Goal Decomposition
View. For example, if the component-and-connector architec-
ture style[61] is used for Resilience Mechanism Implemen-
tation View, each agent in Resilience Goal Decomposition
View is drawn as boxes representing components, and system
behaviors of resilience mechanisms are drawn as connections
launched by these components.
V. RESILIENCE REQUIREMENT ELICITATION
A process framework is proposed in this section to elicit
resilience requirements of MSA Systems represented by the
Service Resilience Requirement Model in Section IV. The
proposed process framework describes how to set service
performance benchmarks and service resilience goals, find
disruptions that cause service resilience goal violations, and
establish resilience mechanisms to mitigate the impact of
disruptions.
9A. Assumptions
The proposed process framework follows these assump-
tions:
• The target MSA System is iteratively developed.
• The first version of the target MSA System has already
been developed and deployed before the eliciting re-
silience requirements.
• There exists a monitoring component in the target MSA
System. And the monitoring component is well-designed
so that necessary performance data of all services and
resources, and service resilience metrics of service degra-
dations can be collected.
• The target MSA System meets its performance require-
ments when no disruptions happen.
• The resilience requirements focus on service performance
degradations caused by disruptions, and software failures
caused by code errors are not considered.
B. Stakeholders of Resilience Requirements
Stakeholders are participants involving software require-
ment elicitation. Following stakeholders in the development
team of an MSA System may participate in the resilience
requirement elicitation process:
• Quality Assurer: Stakeholder for quality assurance is
present in all stages of an MSA System’s development
lifecycle. When eliciting resilience requirements, quality
assurers should provide key performance attributes and
corresponding benchmarks of each service, and then
set service resilience goals according to performance
benchmarks.
• Operation Engineer: Operation engineers deploy the
system and maintain the system after deployment. They
detect service degradations in running MSA Systems, and
find possible root cause disruptions of service degrada-
tions.
• Software Architect: Software architects are responsible
for the architecture of the entire MSA System, or for
the architecture of a single microservice. When disrup-
tions are identified, architects should establish resilience
mechanisms to cope with these disruptions.
• Developer: Developers responsible for developing oper-
ation components in MSA Systems (which sometimes
are called operations developers in DevOps) will imple-
ment resilience mechanisms, so they should know why
resilience mechanisms are required.
• Tester: Testers need to know what is achieved by re-
silience mechanisms in order to design test cases for these
resilience mechanisms.
C. Process Framework for Resilience Requiremenxt Elicita-
tion
Microservice Architecture is an architecture adapting to
the DevOps process [62], thus the resilience requirement
elicitation of MSA Systems is also an iterative process. Figure
9 outlines the steps (bold line boxes) of resilience requirement
elicitation in MSA System development. The proposed pro-
cess framework has three major stages: System Identification,
Identifiy Services
Identify Dependency
Resources
Stage I: System Identification
Set Performance
Benchmarks
Service Degradation
Analysis
Stage II: Resilience Goal
Setting
Set Resilience Goals
Establish Resilience
Mechanisms
Stage III: Disruption
Analysis
Implementation,
Deployment &
Data Colleciton
Fig. 9. Process Framework for Resilience Requirement Elicitation
System
Service Service Service
Container Container Container
Virtual
Machine
Virtual
Machine
Fig. 10. A Sample Identified Architecture of MSA System in Resilience Goal
Decomposition View
Resilience Goal Setting and Disruption Analysis. DevOps
processes after requirement elicitation like system implemen-
tation, deployment and monitoring data collection (the dashed
line box) are not discussed in this paper.
1) Stage I: System Identification:
The architecture of an MSA System including services and
system resources is identified first as the basis of resilience
requirement elicitation. Identified architecture of an MSA
System is represented in Resilience Goal Decomposition View,
by a number of assets linked with each other showing what
services is provided by an MSA System and what system
resources ensure the running of a service, as is shown in Figure
10.
• Identify Services:
Services in an MSA System is identified in order to
set service resilience goals and find dependency sys-
tem resources of these services. Since the Microservice
Architecture is the architectural style which modularize
components as services, microservices in an MSA System
can be directly identified as services on which service
resilience goals are set.
Identified services are represented as assets in Resilience
Goal Decomposition View, and these service assets are
linked to an asset representing the MSA System.
• Identify Dependency Resources:
Service degradations are caused by disruptions which
affect system resources ensuring the running of services.
And resilience mechanisms are established to take action
on these affected system resources. Thus the dependency
system resources of a service need to be identified in
resilience requirement elicitation.
In MSA Systems, services are deployed as
independent to each other as possible. So each
service in an MSA System usually has individual
supporting system resources. Resource dependency
of a service can be generally structured as
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TABLE I
COMMON SERVICE PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES
Performance
Attribute Description Unit
Response
Time
Time taken to send a request and receive
a response ms
Availability Number of successful invocations/total in-vocations %
Throughput Total Number of invocations for a givenperiod of time invokes/s
Successability Number of response / number of requestmessages %
Service
supports←−−−−−− V irtualInfrastructure supports←−−−−−−
PhysicalInfrastructure, which follows the SaaS-
PaaS-IaaS architectural pattern of cloud systems.
The granularity of dependency resource identification
should not be too fine-grained, because too many iden-
tified system resources may reduce the readability of
resilience requirement diagrams. Only system resources
that can be manipulated by system operation components
are needed to be identified, since system behaviors are
terminal goals in Resilience Goal Decomposition View.
In Stage I the architecture of MSA System is identified and
represented in Resilience Goal Decomposition View, in order
to set resilience goals and analysis disruptions in later stages.
As MSA Systems always face changes, the architecture in
Resilience Goal Decomposition View should also be renewed
when microservices are added/removed or the deployment
architecture is changed (e.g. from virtual machine deployment
to container deployment).
2) Stage II: Resilience Goal Setting:
In Stages II, performance benchmarks of services and
resources are determined, and then service resilience goals are
set based on these performance benchmarks in Resilience Goal
Decomposition View.
• Set Performance Benchmarks:
As is defined in MRMM, service resilience of a service
degradation is measured by performance changes on
services comparing to service performance benchmarks.
So performance attributes for services should be deter-
mined after services in an MSA System are identified.
Table I lists common service performance attributes in
standards of IT Systems such as SPEC[63], TPC [64]
[65], ETSI[66], datasets for service performance eval-
uation [67][68], and other researches on web service
metrics selection [69]. Selection of service performance
attributes depends on the type of services, as is discussed
in Section III. Sometimes specific performance attributes
are required to set considering the business need of MSA
Systems. For example, Netflix uses how many streams
are started in a given second as a performance attribute
because it impacts the success of the business[70].
Not only services performance attributes, performance
attributes for services’ dependency resources are also to
be determined. Because a service resilience goal may able
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES OF VIRTUAL INFRASTRUCTURES
Performance
Attribute Description Unit
system.cpu
.util CPU utility %
system.cpu
.intr CPU interrupts per second intr/s
proc.num Number of processes processes
vm.memory
.size.available Available memory %
system.swap
.size.pfree Free swap space(percentage) %
vfs.fs.inode
.pfree Free inodes on / (percentage) %
vfs.fs.size
.pfree Free disk space on / (percentage) %
net.if.in Incoming network traffic bps
net.if.out Outgoing network traffic bps
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES FOR PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Performance
Attribute Description Unit
Instances Created Application Virtual Instances instances
Elasticity
Whether the work performed by applica-
tion instances scales linearly in a cloud
when compared to the performance of ap-
plication instances during baseline phase
%
Mean
Instance
Provi-
sioning
Time
The time interval between the instance
provisioning request and connectivity to
port 22 on the instance
s
CPU
Speed
Average time for a computer to complete
single tasks s
Network
Through-
put
Throughput of network in unit of time bps
be refined to resilience goals of its dependency resources
if service performance is directly influenced by resource
performance, and anomalies in resource performance
benchmarks can also be regarded as disruptions in MSA
Systems.
Table II shows collectable metrics of virtual infrastruc-
tures in monitoring tools like Zabbix, cAdvisor and Heap-
ster (no available performance standard for virtual infras-
tructures is found as far as we studied), and Table III lists
some performance attributes of physical infrastructures in
standards of SPEC[63], TPC[64] and EEMBC[71].
After performance attributes are determined, performance
benchmarks are set on these performance attributes. As is
defined in Section III, performance benchmarks may be
either a constant value or a dynamic value varying from
time. Constant performance benchmark values can be set
by referring to history mean values, expert experience,
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or suggested values in standards. Dynamic performance
benchmark values can be generated by running time se-
ries prediction algorithms (like EWMA, ARIMA, LSTM,
etc.) on historical performance data.
Performance benchmarks are represented as domain prop-
erties in Resilience Goal Decomposition View. Each
performance benchmark is linked to an asset of a service
or a resource, to illustrate that the performance bench-
mark is set for the service/resource. The specification
of a performance benchmark in Resilience Goal De-
composition View contains the performance attribute of
performance benchmark, benchmark value (for dynamic
benchmark values it may be a reference to the data train-
ing result), and references to related standards/discussion
minutes/algorithms if necessary.
• Set Resilience Goals:
As is defined in Section III, service resilience metrics
of a service degradation are calculated from the service
performance benchmark. In Resilience Goal Decomposi-
tion View, a service resilience goal is linked to domain
property of the service performance benchmark.
For each service resilience goal, thresholds for Disruption
Tolerance, Recovery Time and Performance Loss are
set. Not all of these three metrics are required to set
in a service resilience goal since sometimes some of
these metrics are unnecessary or meaningless in certain
performance attributes (For example, Performance Loss
is meaningless for response time).
Thresholds of Disruption Tolerance and Recovery Time
can be set by referring to existing standards or expert
experience on reliability or fault tolerance(e.g. ETSI[72]
has suggested values on minimum acceptable response
time and outage recovery time on different types of
NFV services). And threshold of Performance Loss is
set depending on history disruption data or business need
of the target MSA system.
If the performance of a service is directly influenced
by the performance of its dependency resources (e.g.
TPS of a service is influenced by CPU processing speed
of the service container), the service resilience goal of
this service is refined to resilience goals of dependency
resources. So that system resources affected by disrup-
tions can be found out by detecting resource resilience
goal violations. The way to set thresholds on metrics
of resource resilience goals are the same with service
resilience goals. Figure 11 shows an example that a
service resilience goal is refined to resource resilience
goals in Resilience Goal Decomposition View.
Same with Stage I, Stage II is also an iterative process
that performance benchmarks and service resilience goals are
updated with changes of the MSA Systems.
3) Stage III: Disruption Analysis:
In Stage III, service degradations that violates service re-
silience goals are detected, and these service degradations are
diagnosed to find out possible root cause disruptions. Then
resilience mechanisms are established to mitigate disruptions’
impact.
Service
Container
Virtual
Machine
Service
Benchmark
Container
Benchmark
VM
Benchmark
Service Resilience Goal
Container Resilience Goal
VM Resilience Goal
Fig. 11. A Service Resilience Goal if Refined to Resource Resilience Goals
System
Service Service Service
Service Resilience Goal
Service Resilience Goal
Service Degradation Service Degradation
Fig. 12. Detected Service Degradations Violating Service Resilience Goals
• Service Degradation Analysis:
To achieve service resilience goals in MSA Systems, ser-
vice degradations that violate service resilience goals are
detected and analyzed. Service resilience goal violations
in an MSA System can be easily detected by setting
alarms of service resilience metrics on the monitoring
component. The corresponding service degradations are
represented as obstacles to service resilience goals in
Resilience Goal Decomposition View, as is shown in
Figure 12.
Detected service degradations are further analyzed to find
possible root cause disruptions which affect services’
dependency resources. Detailed ways of making inference
from service degradations to disruption are not discussed
in this paper, since a great number of works have already
been done on performance analysis and fault diagnosis in
software systems.
In Resilience Goal Decomposition View, analyzed service
degradation is substituted by an obstacle representing the
possible root cause disruption. The disruption is linked to
the service’s dependency resource which it affects, and its
original link to service resilience goal may be redirected
to resource resilience goals if resource resilience goal
violations are detected. Moreover, a reference to event
log files may also be attached to a disruption in the form
of domain property. Figure 13 is a sample for founded
disruptions in Resilience Goal Decomposition View.
• Establish Resilience Mechanisms:
When disruptions in MSA Systems are identified, corre-
sponding resilience mechanisms are established to pre-
vent service degradations from service resilience goal
violations. As is described in many practitioner books
of microservices [14] [16], MSA Systems use typical
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Fig. 14. Using Resilience Mechanisms to Resolve Disruptions
fault-tolerance mechanisms used in large-scale internet
applications[60] (e.g. Circuit Breaker, Bulkhead, Active-
Active Redundancy, etc.) as resilience mechanisms. These
mechanisms are usually implemented in standalone com-
ponents/middlewares (like Hystrix, Istio) in MSA Sys-
tems. Depending on the types of disruptions and af-
fected system resources, patterns of resilience mecha-
nisms are different, which has already been concluded
in the literature[73].
A resilience mechanism is presented as a goal refining
service/resource resilience goals and resolving disrup-
tions. The resilience mechanism is further refined, until
detailed system behaviors to manipulate affected system
resources by individual system components are figured
out, and these system behaviors can be represented in Re-
silience Mechanism Implementation View. The reference
to Resilience Mechanism Implementation View and other
references like resilience mechanism patterns are attached
to the resilience mechanism as domain properties. Figure
14 shows a sample resilience mechanism in Resilience
Goal Decomposition View.
After Stage III, the resilience requirement elicitation process
for an MSA System at a certain iteration is finished.
VI. CASE STUDY
In order to verify the feasibility of our proposed resilience
requirement model and resilience requirement elicitation pro-
cess framework, we conducted a case study on an MSA
System. One of the benchmark MSA Systems proposed in
the literature[74] was used as our target system.
In this study, the documentations and deployment configura-
tion files of the target system were read to identify the system’s
services and resources to be used in Stage I. Meanwhile, we
deployed the target system on a cluster of servers, and we used
Fig. 15. User Interface of KAOSer
tools to generate workloads of user operations, collect perfor-
mance data of services and resources, in order to simulate
a real-world running MSA System. By referring to Netflix’s
proposed methodology of finding faults in MSA Systems[70],
we randomly injected faults to our 24*7 running system, to
find disruptions causing service resilience goal violations. The
detected service degradations and monitoring data for service
performance were collected as inputs of Stage II and Stage
III.
In order to draw diagrams of Resilience Goal Decompo-
sition View, we developed an open source web application
called KAOSer 1. Users can create, edit elements in Resilience
Goal Decomposition View, and export the diagram and textual
documentation to their local storage. Figure 15 shows the
user interface of KAOSer. Users can drag elements to the
diagram area from the toolbox on the left, and edit the textual
specifications of these elements by clicking on these elements.
A. System Description
Sock Shop 2 is an open source MSA System for demonstra-
tion and testing of microservice and cloud native technologies.
It is built using Spring Boot, Go kit and Node.js, and is
packaged in Docker containers. Sock Shop provides basic
services of an online shopping system, Figure 16 shows the
architecture of these services.
We deployed Sock Shop on a Kubernetes cluster with one
master node and three worker nodes. A Controller Node
(which contains a bunch of tools including deployment, work-
load simulation, performance monitoring, fault injection, etc.)
was used to generate and collect necessary data for resilience
requirement elicitation. Figure 17 shows the deployment sce-
nario of Sock Shop in our case study.
B. Resilience Requirement Elicitation
The resilience requirement elicitation for Sock Shop follows
the process framework proposed in Section V. Limited by the
length of the paper, we cannot list all service resilience goals,
disruptions and resilience mechanism in our case study. So at
each step we just illustrate a typical example.
1https://github.com/XLab-Tongji/KAOSer
2https://github.com/microservices-demo/microservices-demo
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Fig. 16. Sock Shop Architecture
Sock-Shop
Master Node Worker Node Worker Node Worker Node
Kubernetes
Container Container Container Container Container
Front-End Order Payment User Catalogue Cart
Controller
Node
Jenkins
Locust
Chaos-
Toolkit
Prome-
theus
Fig. 17. Sock Shop Deployment Scenario
1) Stage I: System Identification:
• Identify Services
According to the system architecture shown in Figure 16,
we decomposed Sock Shop into microservices it provides,
as is shown in Figure 18.
• Identify Dependency Resources
Sock Shop was deployed on a Kubernetes Cluster in this
study, so the dependency system resources of services
were identified according to the Kubernetes deployment
configuration file of Sock Shop.
In Kubernetes, a service is deployed on a pod. A pod
is a group of containers having the same functionalities.
Containers in a pod are deployed on worker nodes
of a Kubernetes cluster, and managed by Kubernetes
management services deployed on the master node. In
the Kubernetes configuration file of Sock Shop, there
are pods providing database services to microservices of
Order, User, Cart and Catalogue. These database services
are identified as dependency resources of microservices.
Containers in Kubernetes are deployed to work nodes
Sock-Shop
Front-End Order Payment User Catalogue Cart Shipping
Fig. 18. Services in Sock Shop
TABLE IV
SERVICE PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES OF SOCK SHOP
Service PerformanceAttribute Description Unit
All Services ResponseTime
Average Time taken to send
a request and receive a re-
sponse
ms
Success
Rate
Number of response / number
of request messages %
Order SuccessOrders
Number of finished order per
second orders/s
Cart Add-CartCount
Number of add-to-cart re-
quests per second request/s
User OnlineUsers Number of online users users
dynamically so we didn’t know on which worker node a
container was deployed, so we took the whole Kubernetes
cluster as a dependency resource for all containers. The
Kubernetes cluster is supported by its worker nodes
and Kubernetes management applications running on the
master node. Figure 19 shows identified services and
resources in Resilience Goal Decomposition View of
Sock Shop.
2) Stage II: Resilience Goal Setting:
• Set Performance Benchmarks
Considering the metrics collectable from the monitoring
tool Prometheus, and existing common researches &
standards on web service qualities (which are mentioned
in Section V), we chose the following metrics as the
general service performance attributes since all services
in Sock Shop are transactional services:
– Response Time: Time taken to send a request and
receive a response.
– Success Rate: Number of response / Number of
request messages.
As is instructed in performance benchmark standards like
TPC[65], performance attributes that price services (like
revenue per second per service interaction) are required
for benchmarking transactional services. Since the final
goal of resilience is to prevent business loss caused
by service degradations, we also set some performance
attributes on business for certain services besides general
service performance attributes.
Limited by the capability of our monitoring tool, we
could not directly collect data on total price of an order.
As an alternative, we used the number of success orders,
add-to-cart operations and online users per second, as our
business performance attributes, since they are collectable
and directly impact the ”revenue” of Shop Shop. Table
IV shows all service performance attributes selected for
Sock Shop.
Then the performance attributes of services’ dependency
resources were determined. We just show resource per-
formance attributes of the Order service here, since how
performance attributes are set for dependency resources
of different services are similar.
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Fig. 19. Services and Resources in Sock Shop
The Order service has three performance attributes: Re-
sponse Time, Success Rate and Success Orders. In the
Kubernetes cluster where Sock Shop was deployed, the
Order service was deployed on a pod which consists of
several container instances. Metrics of the Order service’s
performance attributes can be calculated by performance
attributes of containers by the following formulas:
ResponseT ime(Service) =∑n
i (ResponseT ime(Ci)× TPS(Ci))∑n
i TPS(Ci)
(9)
SuccessRate(Service) =∑n
i (SuccessRate(Ci)× TPS(Ci))∑n
i TPS(Ci)
(10)
SuccessOrders(Service) =
n∑
i
(SuccessRate(Ci)× TPS(Ci)) (11)
In Formula 9,10 and 11, n means the number of available
container instances of a POD and Ci means the ith
container instance. The number of available instances
of a pod, TPS, Response Time, and Success Rate of
containers, were selected as performance attributes to be
benchmarked because they directly influence performance
attributes of the Order service.
In this case study, we used a workload generator to
generate workload of a number of users, in order to
simulate a system in a real world and collect performance
data. The workload generator simulated the whole shop-
ping procedure on Sock Shop (including user logging,
browsing items, adding items to cart, submitting orders)
so that workload on all services were ensured. We used
continuous integration tool Jenkins to trigger workloads
in a certain period every day so that a daily behavior
of a running system was simulated. Figure 20 shows
the performance monitoring data with the workload we
simulated.
By referring to mean values of running data we simu-
lated, we set 3 seconds and 90% as the baseline value
of Response Time and Success Rate of services and
containers. The baseline value of Available Instances in
a pod was set to 3 instances, as is configured in our
deployment configuration file. For performance attributes
varying from time like Success Orders and TPS, we used
time series prediction algorithms to build performance
benchmarks. Figure 20 shows the predicted benchmark of
the service performance attribute Success Orders (marked
as red line), calculated by Triple Exponential Smoothing
with historical monitoring data (marked as blue line) on
Success Orders. And Figure 21 shows the representation
of the performance benchmarks of services and resources
in Resilience Goal Decompositions View.
• Set Resilience Goals
We set thresholds of Disruption Tolerance and Recovery
Time by referring to suggested values in ETSI standards.
For Performance Loss, by assuming that 5% loss of
orders in a day is not expected in Sock Shop, the
Performance Loss thresholds for Success Orders of the
Order service and TPS of the Order container instances
were roughly calculated. Table V shows thresholds in
resilience goals of the Order service and its dependency
resources.
As is shown in Formula 9,10 and 11, performance
attributes of the Order service can be calculated by
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Fig. 20. Success Orders of Sock Shop under the Simulated Workload(the Blue Line), and the Performance Benchmark(the Red Line)
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Fig. 21. Performance Benchmarks for the Order Service and its Dependency
Resources
TABLE V
RESILIENCE GOALS OF THE ORDER SERVICE AND ITS DEPENDENCY
RESOURCES
Service/Resource PerformanceAttribute
Disruption
Tolerance
Recovery
Time
Performance
Loss
Order(Service) ResponseTime 10s 5s -
Successability 20% - -
Success Or-
ders - -
500
orders
Order(POD) AvailableInstances
1
instance 2s -
Order(Container) ResponseTime 10s 5s -
Successability 20% - -
TPS - -
150
transac-
tions
performance attributes of its pods and containers. So
service resilience goals of the Order service were refined
to resource resilience goals of the Order services’ pod
and container in Resilience Goal Decomposition View,
as is shown in Figure 22.
3) Stage III: Disruption Analysis:
• Service Degradation Analysis
In this case study, we proactively injected random faults
to our 24*7 running Sock Shop and detected service
degradations violating service resilience goals we set. The
Service(Order)
POD(Order)
Container(Order)
Resilience(Response Time) Resilience(Success Rate)
Resilience(Success Orders)
Resilience(Available Instances)
Resilience(TPS)
Resilience(Response Time)
Resilience(Success Rate)
Fig. 22. Service Resilience Goal Refinement for the Order service
following types of faults were injected by referring to
tutorials of Chaos Engineering [70]:
– Generates high load for one or more CPU cores of
physical machines.
– Allocates a specific amount of a physical machine’s
RAM.
– Put read/write pressure on disks of physicals ma-
chines and containers
– Inject latency to network traffic between containers
– Induce packet loss to a container network.
– Reboot the physical machines
– Kill a POD in Kubernetes
– Kill management processes of Kubernetes
We used the alert manager in Prometheus to alarm when
resilience goal violations were found. Finally we detected
37 service degradations that violate service resilience
goals during the 5-day running with fault injections. The
number of violated service degradations is acceptable
because both Shop Shop and Kubernentes are open source
projects, and we just used only 5 physical machines to
build up our system.
Considering the length of the paper, here we just show
how a service degradation detected is analyzed and re-
solved.
Figure 23 shows a service degradation detected on the
Order Service that violated the service resilience goal
on Success Orders. By searching fault injection logs
and related monitoring data, we found that the service
degradation was caused by the network delay we injected
to containers of the Order service, and it also violates
resilience goals on TPS of the Order service’s container,
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Fig. 23. A Service Degradation Violating Service Resilience Goal of the
Order Service
Order
POD(Order)
Container(Order)
Resilience(Success Orders)
Resilience(Available Instances)
Resilience(TPS)
Resilience(Success Rate)
Network Delay
Fig. 24. Root Cause Disruption of the Service Degradation in Figure 23
as is shown in Figure 24.
• Establish Resilience Mechanisms
Network delays on containers impact the container’s
ability to process transactions, so we planned to transfer
more transactions to other normal container instances
when network delay on a container is detected. This can
be realized by using Service Mesh to control network
traffics among containers. In order to implement container
network traffic control, the sidecar component Enovy is
injected to all containers to proxy container network
connection, and the Service Mesh middleware, Istio, is
used to monitor and manage traffic among sidecars.
Kubernetes is responsible for injecting sidecars to con-
tainers. Figure 25 shows how this resilience mechanism
is represented in Resilience Goal Decomposition View,
and Figure 26 shows the representation in Resilience
Mechanism Implementation View.
After integrating Service Mesh to Kubernetes, we tested
the resilience mechanism by injecting the same fault
again. Collected monitoring data are shown in Figure 27.
The service degraded a bit in testing but no alarm on
resilience goal violation was reported, which proves that
the established resilience mechanism for the disruption is
effective.
VII. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the microservice architecture has already
been a mainstream architecture adopted by internet compa-
nies. In cases when achieving higher system reliability is no
longer affordable and failure is inevitable [75], microservice
practitioners start to use the word ”resilience” to describe the
Resilience(TPS)
Network Delay
Use Service Mesh to Control
Container Traffic
Enovy
Proxy Container Network
Connections Manage Sidecar Traffic
Inject Sidecars to
Containers
Istio Kubernetes
Istio
Documentation
Service Mesh
Implementation
Fig. 25. Resilience Mechanism Established for Container Network Delay
Istio
Enovy
Kubernetes
Inject Sidecars
Service
Proxy
Container
EnovyService
Proxy
Container
EnovyService
Proxy
Container
Manage
Network
Traffics
Fig. 26. Resilience Mechanism in Resilience Mechanism Implementation
View
Fig. 27. Monitoring Data of Success Orders after Integrating Service Mesh
to Kubernetes
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ability coping with failures. However, due to no consensus
on definitions and measurements of resilience, microservice
practitioners seldom have a clear idea on how to evaluate
the resilience of an MSA System and how resilient an MSA
System is supposed to be.
In this work, we have the following contributions:
• The definition of microservice resilience is provided by
referring to systematic studies on resilience in other
scientific areas. And a Microservice Reslience Measure-
ment Model is proposed to measure service resilience of
service degradations.
• Service Resilience Requirement Model is proposed to
represent service resilience goals, disruptions and re-
silience mechanisms. The requirement model uses goal
model to refine service resilience goals with thresholds
of resilience metrics in MRMM, to system behaviors to
be implemented in MSA Systems.
• We propose the process framework for microservice
resilience requirement elicitation. The process framework
outlines steps to set service resilience goals, analysis
disruptions and establish resilience mechanisms against
disruptions.
Possible limitation of our proposed work, which can be
improved in future work, include the followings:
• The MRMM model gives measurable resilience metrics to
evaluate a service’s resilience, and it may be worthwhile
to find a modeling technique to model system resilience
with service resilience.
• Verification on goal satisfaction is an important type
of research in Goal Modeling. We have already given
mathematical presentations of notions in our measure-
ment model and requirement model. How to encode these
mathematical presentations into formal languages, and
verify them with model checkers, are future works of
this paper.
• In our case study, an open source microservice project
was used as the target system. The target system con-
tains not too many microservice so that we can easily
build resilience documents with manual efforts. For large
scale MSA Systems, generating resilience requirements
completely manually is difficult because there are a
lot of services and resources to be identified. So auto
generation techniques (e.g. Generate the architecture of
the system by reading deployment configuration files) for
our resilience requirement model is needed.
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